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CONTROL THY NEIGHBOR: THE THIRD CIRCUIT UPHOLDS
DIRECT FEDERAL CONTROL OF INTERSTATE AIR
POLLUTERS IN GENON REMA LLC V EPA
"On some days even if we shut down the entire state, we
would be in violation of some health standards because of
pollution coming over from other states."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The above statement, uttered by late NewJersey Senator, Frank
Lautenberg, describes an ongoing pollution control problem: inter-
state air pollution.2 Lautenberg lamented the inequitable transport
of air pollution into NewJersey from neighboring states.3 Air pollu-
tion hinders not only states' ability to meet standards promulgated
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but also contrib-
utes to two hundred thousand premature deaths in the United
States annually.4 Interstate air pollution occurs when emissions in
one state travel with the wind and adversely affect air quality and
public health in another state.5
Due to cross-continental wind patterns, interstate air pollution
significantly affects Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states.6 The
1. Smother My Neighbour, ECONOMIST (Sept. 4, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://www.
economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/09/interstate-pollution (quot-
ing late Senator Frank Lautenberg) (noting problem of upwind states transmitting
air pollution to downwind states).
2. Id. (discussing interstate pollution). For background material and an over-
view of the jurisprudence pertaining to interstate air pollution in the United
States, see infra notes 43-157 and accompanying text.
3. See id. For a discussion of New Jersey's most recent attempt to regulate
interstate air pollution, see infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
4. Susan C. Anenberg et at, An Estimate of the Global Burden of Anthropogenic
Ozone and Fine Particulate Matter on Premature Human Mortality Using Atmospheric Mod-
eling, 118 ENVrL. HEALTH PERSP. 1189, 1194-95 (Sept. 2010), available at http://
ehp.niehs.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/118/9/ehp.0901220.pdf (stating number
of annual deaths attributable to air pollution in United States).
5. See A Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act, Interstate and International Air
Pollution, ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/peg-caa/inter-
state.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2012) (noting air pollution travels great distances
with wind). Taller smoke stacks have the ability to release pollutants into wind
currents that carry pollutants thousands of miles. Id.
6. See generally Clean Air Interstate Rule, Where You Live, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/cair/where.html (last updatedJuly 31, 2012) (providing map-
ping tool to show states' emission contribution to nonattainment). The EPA map-
ping tool provides users with information for NAAQS attainment in each state. Id.
For example, New Jersey receives ground-level Ozone from Delaware, Maryland,
(569)
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states most involved in efforts to combat interstate air pollution are
members of the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), an organiza-
tion of twelve Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states who attempt to
improve air quality in the region.7 For years, OTC "downwind
states," states that receive pollution from out-of-state, attempted to
compel the EPA to regulate "upwind states," states that transport air
pollution.8
The EPA attempted to mitigate interstate air pollution with its
most recent transport rule, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
(CSAPR). 9 However, the D.C. Circuit struck down CSAPR in 2012,
and CSAPR's fate awaits the Supreme Court's decision.' 0 Without a
multi-state air transport regulation such as CSAPR, OTC states must
wage difficult case-by-case fights against upwind states that interfere
with their ability to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS). 1' A recent case, however, offers downwind states an al-
the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and West Virginia. See id.
7. What is the Ozone Transport Commission, OZONE-TRANSPORT COMM'N, http://
www.otcair.org/about.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (listing member states and
goals of OTC). The OTC members include: Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. Id. The goal of the
OTC is to "bring[ ] together the states from Virginia to Maine to coordinate reduc-
tions in air pollution that benefit the whole region." Id.
8. See, e.g., AGs to Sue Bush Administration for Gutting Clean Air Act: EPA Plans to
Exempt Half of Air Pollution Sources from Key Clean Air Rules, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON
ENV'T. & PUB. WORXs (Nov. 22, 2002), http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStoreid=bc838bf9-2dbl-4abl-b043-aee3adf558cd
(announcing Attorney Generals' plan to sue over new pollution rules). The AGs
from New York, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
NewJersey, Rhode Island, and Vermontjointly planned to file suit against the EPA
for changing its New Source Review standard, which the AGs believed would dis-
proportionately impact the Northeast. Id. Connecticut AG Richard Blumenthal
stated, "Today's message from the Bush Administration seems to be: Northeast
Drop Dead. The Administration is literally sacrificing the lives of people in the
Northeast to appease the energy industry." Id. For a discussion of prior attempts
by OTC states to regulate interstate air pollution, see infra notes 61-76 accompany-
ing text.
9. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,208
(Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 51, 52, 72) [hereinafter CSAPR]
(prescribing rules governing NOx and SO2 in twenty-seven states). For a discussion
of regulations addressing interstate air pollution and resulting court cases, see in-fta notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
10. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d 7, 7 (3d
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4801 (Mar. 29, 2013) (vacating CSAPR).
As this Note was going to press, the Supreme Court upheld CSAPR in EPA. v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014).
11. For a discussion of NAAQS and how they are implemented, see infra notes
43-60 and accompanying text.
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ternative avenue to address air pollution transport while they wait
for the Supreme Court to weigh in on CSAPR.12
In GenOn REMA L.L.C. v. EPA,"3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the EPA's direct control of
sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions from a coal-fired power plant based
on a Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 126(b) petition by a downwind
state.14 S02, a precursor to acid rain, negatively affects human
health, agriculture, wildlife, and water bodies through a process
known as acid deposition.' 5 Furthermore, S02 is one of the six cri-
teria air pollutants for which NAAQS exist, although those NAAQS
are difficult for OTC states to attain.' 6 GenOn REMA marks the sec-
ond-ever use of a Section 126(b) petition to control interstate air
pollution and is a decision of magnified importance given the un-
certainty surrounding CSAPR.17
This Note examines the Third Circuit's analysis in GenOn
REMA concerning the CAA and predicts the decision's impact on
downwind states' ability to hold upwind states accountable for inter-
12. For a background, analysis, and discussion of states' alternative avenues to
regulate air pollution, see infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
13. 722 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2013).
14. Id. at 515 (denying petitioner's request for review). Section 126(b) states,
"Any State or political subdivision may petition the Administrator for a finding that
any major source or group of stationary sources emits or would emit any air pollu-
tant in violation of the prohibition of section 7410(a) (2) (D) (ii) of this title or this
section." 42 U.S.C. § 7426.
15. See GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 517 (citing Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d
388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (describing effects of acid rain). SO2 has negative
health effects, especially in individuals with respiratory illnesses such as asthma. Id.
See also PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
84-86 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining history and effects of acid rain). The first evi-
dence of acid rain was discovered in the 1970s, when scientists observed fish kills in
lakes and streams in the Northeastern United States not attributable to water pol-
lution. Id. Scientists eventually determined the cause was sulfates entering the
water through rain and snow with high levels of NOx and SO 2. Id. Acid rain has
far-reaching effects beyond fish kill; it damages forests and stonework and acidifies
soil. Id. The chief cause is SO, and NOx emissions from power plants and other
stationary sources burning coal with high sulfur content. Id.
16. For a discussion of NAAQS, criteria pollutants, and states' problems with
meeting standards, see infra notes 43-76 and accompanying text.
17. See GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 513 (upholding second ever Section 126(b)
petition). The first ever EPA grant of Section 126(b) petition was in Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For a discussion of Appalachian,
see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
2014] 571
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state air pollution.'8 Part II summarizes the facts in GenOn REMA."
Next, Part III provides background of the CAA and relevant court
decisions that led to GenOn REMVA's result.2 0 Part IV reviews the
Third Circuit's legal analysis in GenOn REMA. 21 Part V then consid-
ers the court's decision in light of prior jurisprudence and the lan-
guage of the CAA. 22 Finally, Part VI predicts GenOn REMA's impact
on interstate air transport, NAAQS regulation, and State Implemen-
tation Plans (SIPs).23
II. NEW JERSEY DEMANDS PENNSYLVANIA FENCE IN ITS AIR
POLLUTION: THE FACTS OF GENON REMA
In GenOn REMA, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit determined whether the EPA acted within its author-
ity under the CAA when it promulgated a rule placing direct emis-
sion limits on the Portland Generating Station (Portland) in
response to a CAA Section 126(b) petition filed by the State of New
Jersey.24 The energy company GenOn operates Portland in Upper
Mount Bethel Township, Pennsylvania.25 Portland sits on the banks
of the Delaware River, only five hundred feet from Pennsylvania's
border with NewJersey.26 Due to Portland's close proximity to New
Jersey, significant portions of its SO2 emissions travel across the Del-
aware River into New Jersey. 27 The State of New Jersey, therefore,
18. For a narrative analysis of GenOn REMA, see infra notes 123-157 and ac-
companying text. For a critical analysis of the GenOn REMA holding, see infra
notes 158-190 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the potential impact
GenOn REMA may have on the future of interstate air transport regulation, see
infra notes 191-215 and accompanying text.
19. For a summary of the facts and issues presented in GenOn REMA, see infra
notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
20. For background material pertaining to the CAA, see infra notes 43-60 and
accompanying text. For an overview of interstate transport regulations in the
United States, see infra notes 61-122.
21. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's rationale, see infra notes 123-157
and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of Third Circuit's holding, see infra notes 158-190
and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the future impacts of GenOn REMA, see infra notes 191-
215 and accompanying text.
24. GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 513 (3d Cir. 2013) (addressing
EPA's promulgation of rule at request of State of New Jersey).
25. Id. at 515 (providing information concerning GenOn REMA's operation).
26. Id. at 515-16 (describing factual background that led New Jersey to peti-
tion EPA).
27. Id. at 518 (stating emissions from Portland traveled directly into New
Jersey).
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posited Portland directly interfered with its attainment of the new
one-hour S02 NAAQS required by the CAA.28
On September 17, 2010, the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJ DEP) filed a petition under Section
126(b) of the CAA.29 The NJ DEP filed the petition because "de-
spite the air quality problems [Portland] has caused [New Jersey]
for years, New Jersey ha [d] no regulatory authority to require Port-
land to install air pollution controls."30 The petition requested the
EPA to promulgate a rule restricting Portland's S02 emissions be-
cause it "significantly contribute[d] to nonattainment or inter-
fere[d] with maintenance of the 1-hour S02 [NAAQS] in New
Jersey."3 1
Based on the NJ DEP's petition, the EPA determined that S02
from Portland "alone, caused downwind violations of the 1-hour S02
NAAQS in New Jersey."32 The EPA, thereafter, issued a Proposed
28. Id. (stating basis for filing petition).
29. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d. at 517-18 (providing date NJ DEP filed petition).
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2012) (stating statutory language). Section
126 provides:
Petition for finding that major sources emit or would emit prohibited air
pollutants Any State or political subdivision may petition the Administra-
tor for a finding that any major source or group of stationary sources
emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation of the prohibition of
section 7410(a) (2) (D) (ii) of this title or this section. Within 60 days after
receipt of any petition under this subsection and after public hearing, the
Administrator shall make such a finding or deny the petition.
42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2012). In Appalachian, the cross-reference to "section
7410(a) (2) (D) (ii)," cited above, was determined to be a scrivener's error; the cor-
rect cross-reference, therefore, is 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (D) (i). See GenOn REMA,
722 F.3d. at 517 n.3 (identifying error). The parties in GenOn REMA, further,
agreed with the correction. Id.
30. Final Brief of Intervenor-Respondent, GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722
F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1022), 2012 WL 4194550, at *1 (discussing reasons
for lodging petition).
31. See GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 518 (reciting arguments made in New
Jersey's petition to EPA). The EPA supported its position by submitting its own air
quality and aerial dispersion modeling to show that emissions from Portland
caused violations in four NewJersey counties. Id. See also Primary National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standard for Sulfur Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,520, 35,521 (June 22,
2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 53, 58) [hereinafter 1-hour SO 2 NAAQS] (pro-
viding new standards and dates for SO2 NAAQS). The new 1-hour NAAQS low-
ered the threshold concentration for SO2 to seventy-five parts per billion based on
the 3-year average of the annual 99th percentile of 1-hour daily maximum concen-
tration. Id. at 35,523. The deadline for SIP submission was June 2013. Id. at
35,557. States must achieve attainment of the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS level by August
2017. Id.
32. Final Response to Petition from New Jersey Regarding SO 2 Emissions
from the Portland Generating Station, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,052, 69,057 (Nov. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter Portland Rule] (emphasis added) (providing summary of modeling
conducted by NJ DEP). The EPA stated further in the Portland Rule:
2014] 573
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Rule on April 7, 2011, imposing direct federal limits on Portland's
emissions in addition to a schedule of restrictions to reduce its con-
tribution to air pollution within three years.33 The Proposed Rule
sought to "bring the plant into compliance as expeditiously as prac-
ticable with the CAA," while allowing the plant to continue
operation. 34
As per Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements, the
EPA gave notice and received public comments from various indi-
viduals, government officials, environmental groups, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, the NJ DEP, GenOn, and the American
Lung Association, among others.35 Following the notice and com-
ment period, the EPA issued its Final Rule (the Portland Rule) on
November 7, 2011, granting the petition and unequivocally stating
"Portland's [SO 2] emissions significantly contribute [d] to nonat-
tainment and interfere [d] with maintenance of the 1-hour SO2
NAAQS in New Jersey."36 The Portland Rule, moreover, required
Portland to reduce emissions by eighty-one percent in three years,
two years before Pennsylvania's deadline to attain the new one-hour
SO2 NAAQS. 37
GenOn, Portland's owner, along with the Utility Air Regularity
Group (UARG), petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
Given the magnitude of the modeling violations, which were nearly seven
times the 1-hour SO NAAQS based on AERMOD modeling of maximum
allowable emissions, and the fact that significant exceedances of the
NAAQS were also shown based on modeling of estimated actual emis-
sions, the EPA concluded that the NJDEP had clearly shown that SO2
emissions from Portland cause violations of the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS in
New Jersey.
Portland Rule, supra, at 69,057.
33. Response to Petition from NewJersey Regarding SO2 Emissions from the
Portland Generating Station, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,662, 19,662 (Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Rule] (supporting petition from New Jersey and proposing reduc-
tions of emissions from Portland).
34. See id. at 19,664 (stating purpose of granting proposed rule).
35. See Portland Rule, supra note 32, at 69,064-65 (addressing participants'
comments). Many comments favored the Proposed Rule; the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection submitted a comment acknowledging that re-
sidents of Pennsylvania would realize public health and environmental benefits
from a reduction in SO 2 emissions but suggested some alterations to the proposed
compliance schedule. Id. Despite having commented, the state of Pennsylvania
did not participate in GenOn's petition of EPA rulemaking. Id.
36. Id. at 69,052-53 (stating findings based on EPAs own modeling). The
Portland Rule states it could have forced the plant to seize operation in three
months, but instead it granted an extension. Id.
37. Id. at 69,053 (discussing emission limitations placed on Portland facility).
Compare 1-hour S02 NAAQS, supra note 31, at 35,557 (requiring NAAQS attain-
ment by 2017), with Portland Rule, supra note 32, at 69,052-53 (requiring emission
limitations by 2015).
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cuit to review the Portland Rule and challenged the EPA's authority
to impose direct regulations before Pennsylvania completed its Sec-
tion 110 SIP process for the new one-hour S02 NAAQS. 38 GenOn
alleged the EPA must still adhere to the CAA's Section 110 when
granting a Section 126(b) petition. 9 Conversely, the EPA con-
tended it could make a finding on Section 126(b) independently of
the Section 110 SIP process.40 The Third Circuit adopted the
EPA's viewpoint and, by applying the framework set forth in Chev-
ron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council,41 held the EPA could
directly regulate emissions from Portland before Pennsylvania com-
pleted its Section 110 SIP for the new one-hour S02 NAAQS. 42
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act and Cooperative Federalism
Recognizing air quality as essential to human health, President
Richard Nixon and Congress concurrently created the EPA and en-
acted major CAA Amendments in 1970.43 The CAA obligates the
EPA to promulgate NAAQS for criteria pollutants. 4 4 Criteria pollu-
tants are pollutants the EPA determines will "cause or contribute to
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger pub-
lic health or welfare."4 5 The EPA, therefore, sets NAAQS at levels
"requisite to protect the public health."4 6 The CAA requires
NAAQS implementation through "cooperative federalism," which
38. See GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 519 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating
basis for GenOn's petition.
39. For a discussion of GenOn and the UARG's arguments, see infra notes
123-157 and accompanying text.
40. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 519 (asserting EPA can find 126(b) petitions
independently of Section 110).
41. 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984). For an explanation of the Chevron two-prong
framework for statutory interpretation of agency action, see infra notes 106-122
and accompanying text.
42. See GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 526-27 (concluding EPA had authority to
promulgate Portland Rule).
43. See Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401) (creating EPA and greatly ex-
tending CAA).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(2) (2012) (directing EPA to promulgate air quality
standards).
45. Id. § 7408 (a) (1) (A) (requiring NAAQS standard protect public health
and establish criteria for pollutants). The other five criteria pollutants are ozone,
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, NOx, and lead. See What are the Six Common
Air Pollutants?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENcy, http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/urbanair
(last updated Apr. 20, 2012) (providing information pertaining to criteria
pollutants).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012) (stating purpose of NAAQS).
2014] 575
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makes "the States and the Federal Government partners in the
struggle against air pollution."4 7
Cooperative federalism requires the EPA to promulgate
NAAQS and each state to develop a SIP.48 SIPs, required in part by
CAA Section 110, are the primary mechanism by which states pro-
vide for the "implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of
NAAQS.4 9 Through their SIPs, states determine the pollution con-
trol requirements and emission limitations needed to meet
NAAQS. 5o
After creating a SIP, the state must submit it to the EPA for
review.51 On review, the EPA can approve, reject, or conditionally
approve the submission. 52 If the EPA approves the SIP, it becomes
enforceable as federal law.5 3 Alternatively, if the EPA finds the SIP
is inadequate to maintain a NAAQS, or the SIP is in noncompliance
with the CAA, the EPA may issue a "SIP Call," which requires the
47. See Brief for Respondents, GenOn REMA LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513 (3d
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1022), 2012 WV L 2956694, at *5 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v.
United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990)) (discussing relationship between states
and federal government for implementation of NAAQS); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7407(a) (2012) (providing states with discretion to determine air quality con-
trol). The Statute provides states with "the primary responsibility for assuring air
quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State by [specifying] ...
the manner in which . .. air quality standards will be achieved and maintained." Id.
But cf Jamie Gibbs Pleune, Do We CAIR About Cooperative Federalism in the Clean Air
Act, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 537, 537 (2006) (arguing EPA upsets state and federal
balance of cooperative federalism in CAA). Pleune focuses on the statutory basis
for CAIR and argues the EPA's requirement that states amend their SIPs "contra-
venes cooperative federalism by usurping state authority to make policy decisions
left to state discretion in their implementation plans." Pleune, supra, at 537.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(1) (2012) (requiring states to adopt and submit
SIPs).
49. Id. § 7410(1) (a) (requiring state's SIP to provide for proper NAAQS stan-
dards in each air quality control region). Air quality control regions contain three
possible designations for NAAQS of each six criteria pollutants: attainment, nonat-
tainment, and unclassifiable. Id. § 7407(d) (1) (B) (iii) (listing three possible area
designations). First, an area in attainment is an area that meets the NAAQS for a
criteria pollutant. Id. § 7407(d) (1) (A) (ii). Second, an area in nonattainment is
"any area that does not meet (or that contributes to ambient air quality in a nearby
area that does not meet)" the NAAQS for the pollutant. Id. § 7407(d) (1) (A) (i).
Third, an area is unclassifiable if the area "cannot be classified on the basis of
available information as meeting or not meeting" the NAAQS for the pollutant.
Id. § 7407(d) (1) (A) (iii). It is possible, however, for an area to be in nonattain-
ment for one NAAQS and be in attainment of another. Id.
50. Id. § 7410(2) (a) (requiring enforceable emission limitations and other
control measures).
51. Id. § 7410(a)(1) (requiring state to submit SIP to EPA within three years
after promulgation of NAAQS or NAAQS revision).
52. Id. § 7410(b) (3) (B) (requiring EPA to review SIPs as soon as practicable).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2012) (stating requirements of federal enforcement).
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state to submit a revised SIP to correct its inadequacies.5 4 If the
state fails to correct such inadequacies or submit a revised SIP, the
CAA compels the EPA to promulgate a Federal Implementation
Plan (FIP) that replaces the state's SIP and will directly control the
sources of air pollution in that state.5 5
Section 110 also contains subsection (a)(2)(d), known collo-
quially as the "Good Neighbor Provision."5 6 The Good Neighbor
Provision obligates a state's SIP to prohibit pollution sources within
its borders that "contribute significantly" to the nonattainment of,
or "interfere with maintenance" of, NAAQS in other states.5 7 Prior
to 1990, the Good Neighbor Provision proved ineffective at curbing
air transport because it lacked a clear standard of review and imple-
mentation.5 8 The 1990 amendments attempted to clarify the CAA
by adding the language "contribute significantly" as a standard to
measure upwind states' impact on downwind states.5 9 This stan-
dard, however, did little to alleviate the problems frustrating EPA
regulations, as illustrated in CSAPR.60
B. Prior Attempts at Interstate Transport Rules
While the EPA promulgated some lasting rules, more compre-
hensive transport rules promulgated under the Good Neighbor
Provision's authority failed.6' The Clean Air Interstate Rule
(CAIR), promulgated in 2005, was the first expansive multi-pollu-
54. Id. § 7410(k) (5) (requiring state to resubmit its SIP to EPA in response to
SIP call). The EPA must notify the state of the SIP's inadequacies and establish a
reasonable deadline no longer than eighteen months for the submission of a re-
vised plan. Id.
55. Id. §7410(c) (directing EPA to promulgate FIP). The CAA requires the
EPA to promulgate a FIP within two years following a finding a state failed to re-
vises its SIP. Id. §7410(c) (1).
56. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (requiring states' SIPs to contain provisions ad-
dressing interstate air pollution).
57. Id. (providing standards for states regarding interstate air pollution).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 330 (1977), repfinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1077 (discussing shortcomings of good neighbor provision). The 1977 hearings
noted, "The problem of interstate pollution remains a serious one that requires a
better solution." Id. The Committee further stated "an effective program must not
rely on prevention or abatement action by the State in which the source of the
pollution is located, but rather by the State . . . which receives the pollution and
the harm, and thus which has the incentive and need to act." Id.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2012) (requiring upwind states to not
significantly contribute to downwind pollution).
60. For a discussion of problems regulations face from "significant contribu-
tion," see infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
61. For more information on CAIR and CSAPR, the two largest regulations to
address interstate air pollution, both of which were vacated, see infra notes 62-76
and accompanying text.
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tant rule enforcing the Good Neighbor Provision.62 It included
twenty-eight states and expanded an earlier trading program for ni-
trogen oxide (NOx) trading by including SO2 .6 3 Created in re-
sponse to the Clear Skies campaign advocated for by the market-
oriented Bush Administration, CAIR created a permit market for
S02 and NOx-emitting facilities. 64 At its most basic level, CAIR
functions as a cap and trade program for SO2 and NOx.65 The pro-
gram operates by issuing facilities a finite amount of permits for
"the right to emit" SO2 and NOx that facilities can then trade
amongst themselves. 66
In the same year, the D.C. Circuit remanded CAIR in North
Carolina v. EPA67 because the rule failed to address what emission
level constituted a "significant contribution" to downwind states'
NAAQS nonattainment as required by the Good Neighbor Provi-
sion. 68 The court remanded the rule without vacatur, though; the
62. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to
the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R
Pt. 51, 72, et al.) [hereinafter CAIR] (establishing multi-state transport rule for
SO 2)
63. Id. at 25,168 (explaining trading program).
64. See Pleune, supra note 47, at 545. (citations omitted) (discussing impact of
President Bush's Clear Skies Program on creation of CAIR); see also Clear Skies:
Basic Information, ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/basic.html
(last updated May 18, 2012) (summarizing changes proposed by Clear Skies Act).
The Clear Skies Act sought to reduce SO2 emissions by 73%, reduce NOx emis-
sions by 67%, and reduce mercury emissions by 69%. Id. However, the EPA never
enacted the Clear Skies Program, due to disapproval of its New Source Review
Program. Pleune, supra note 47, at 545 (stating history that influenced CAIR's
promulgation).
65. Pleune, supra note 47, at 549 (stating CAIR was cap and trade program).
The rule built on prior regulations such as the Acid Rain Program and NAAQS SIP
Call. Id. CAIR operated through the Good Neighbor Provision, partially to solve
the ongoing pollution control problems in OTC states. Id.
66. See id. at 551 (explaining CAIR's cap and trade program). Pleune pro-
vides a simple explanation of cap and trade:
Once the emissions credits have been allocated, individual power plants
enjoy flexibility to determine how they will meet their pollution allow-
ance. Plants can either install technology to reduce their emissions or
purchase pollution credits from other sources with excess credits. If
power plants reduce more emissions than required by their allowance,
they can either sell the additional credits or bank them. Sources can use
their banked credits later when the cap ratchets down allowable
emissions.
Id. at 552
67. 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
68. Id. at 907 (stating one reason for vacatur). In CAIR, the state of North
Carolina and a coalition of electric utility providers challenged aspects of the rule's
SO 2 provisions. Id. at 905. Environmental groups, alternatively, intervened on be-
half of the EPA. Id. The court in North Carolina unanimously struck down CAIR
on five grounds. First, the EPA did not give significance to the phrase "interfere
10
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ruling compelled the EPA to promulgate a new rule enforcing the
Good Neighbor Provision.69 The new rule, however, as CAIR had
been before it, would be short-lived.7 0
Promulgated by the EPA in 2011, CSAPR employed air disper-
sion modeling similar to CAIR to determine a state's specific contri-
bution to downwind nonattainment and assigned each state a
budget to eliminate its "significant contribution" to nonattainment
in downwind states.71 Unlike CAIR, however, CSAPR "prescribe [d]
[FIPs] to implement those obligations at the State level," rather
than first allowing states' SIPs to implement reductions. 72 In its Au-
gust 21, 2012, decision in EME Homer v. EPA,73 the D.C. Circuit held
CSAPR exceeded the EPA's statutory authority. 7 4 The basis for va-
catur included CSAPRs over-control of states in violation of the
Good Neighbor Provision and its premature imposition of FIPs on
states before states implemented their own SIPs.75 The EPA contin-
ues to be eluded by regulatory implementation of the Good Neigh-
with maintenance." Id. at 929. Second, the EPA must decide the date for states to
eliminate their significant contribution to downwind nonattainment. North Caro-
lina, 531 F.3d at 929. Third, the EPA failed to connect a measurement of signifi-
cant contribution to downwind nonattainment. Id. Fourth, reductions in SO2 only
related to the Title IV trading program. Id. at 930. Five, the SO 2 caps were arbi-
trary because the EPA based them on the irrelevant factors. Id.
69. See id. at 907 (remanding CAIR without vacatur); see also CSAPR, supra
note 9, at 48,2011 (explaining reason for promulgating CSAPR is in response to
North Carolina remanding CAIR without vacatur).
70. Compare CSAPR, supra note 9, at 48,208 (noting effective date of rule as
October 7, 2011), with EME Homer City Generation, LP v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 7 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (striking down CSAPR in 2012).
71. See CSAPR, supra note 9, at 48,211 (noting similarities to CAIR). The EPA
stated it would keep aspects of CAIR that worked while responding to the court
decision in North Carolina. Id.
72. Carla M. Gray, Comment, What Now? The Future of EPA Transport Programs
Following Vacatur of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 14 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 103,
114 (2012) (quoting EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 15) (noting differences between
CAIR and CSAPR).
73. 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
74. Id. at 11 (noting CSAPR exceeded authority of Good Neighbor Provi-
sion). As this note was going to press, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided EPA v. EME Homer City Ceneration L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014),
which overturned the D.C. Circuit's ruling and upheld CSAPR.
75. See id. (discussing reason for vacating CSAPR). The court's substantive
holding to vacate CSAPR relied on EPA overstepping authority granted under
good neighbor provision. Id. The court gave two reasons: First, the court held
that the EPA improperly used the good neighbor provision because CSAPR re-
quired reductions in upwind states beyond those required by good neighbor provi-
sion. Id. Essentially, the duel regulation of upwind and downwind states resulted
in "over control." Id. Second, the court stated the EPA departed from the usual
enforcement of the Good Neighbor Provision, which allows states to first imple-
ment SIPs before being required by the EPA to follow a FIP. Id.
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bor Provision, although Section 126 exists to facilitate its regulatory
implementation.7 6
C. The Seldom Granted Section 126(b) Petition
Although promulgating a lasting transport rule proves prob-
lematic for the EPA, an alternative mechanism exists to enforce the
Good Neighbor Provision.77 Enacted concurrently with the mod-
ern Good Neighbor Provision in 1990, Section 126, in pertinent
part, allows downwind states to petition the EPA to find "any major
source or group of stationary sources" in an upwind state that
"emits or would emit any air pollutant [to be] in violation of [The
Good Neighbor Provision]."78 The EPA must make a finding
within sixty days of receiving a Section 126(b) petition; further Sec-
tion 126(c) requires no major source operate longer than three
months following a 126(b) finding against it." If the EPA grants a
downwind state's 126(b) petition, it can impose a FIP on a single
pollution source in an upwind state without going through the nor-
mal SIP process in Section 110.60 OTC states, resultantly, at-
tempted to evoke Section 126 petitions since Section 126's
enactment, though the EPA has seldom found in their favor.,,
Beginning as early as 1981, downwind states petitioned the
EPA, albeit unsuccessfully, under Section 126(b) to control upwind
states' emissions.8 2 In Connecticut v. EPA,83 Connecticut and New
Jersey argued that because Section 110 requires SIPs to comply with
Section 126, a possible violation of Section 126 is a prerequisite for
the EPA's approval of a SIP revision under Section 110.84 The Sec-
76. For a discussion of the alternative, Section 126(b) statute, see infra notes
77-95 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of other ways states can invoke the Good Neighbor Provi-
sion, see infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2012) (stating section's requirements).
79. Id. § 7426(c) (2) (providing timeline for regulation after Section 126(b)
finding has been made).
80. For critical analysis of whether Section 126(b) operates independently of
the Good Neighbor Provision, see infra notes 158-189 and accompanying text.
81. For a discussion of the reason for the seldom use of section 126(b), see
infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
82. See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (responding to
Section 126(b) petition); see also, Kay M. Crider, Interstate Air Pollution: Over A Dec-
ade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 619, 651 (1988) (discussing history
of 126(b) usage).
83. 656 F.2d 902, 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 907 (stating Connecticut and New Jersey's argument). To date,
courts and the EPA disfavor the view that Sections 126 and 110 operate as the same
proceeding. See Crider, supra note 82, at 626 (discussing unwillingness for court
and EPA to accept duel construction of Section 126(b)).
12
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ond Circuit disagreed, concluding Section 126 existed primarily to
resolve disputes when a state failed to revise its SIP.85 The trend to
petition continued in a 1988 case, New York v. EPA,86 in which New
York petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review the EPA's denial to grant
its Section 126(b) petition.87 New York argued a 126(b) petition
obligated the EPA to review an upwind state's SIP.88 The court,
again, sided with the EPA and found no affirmative duty requiring
the EPA to review a SIP in response to a 126(b) petition. 9
The EPA granted a 126(b) petition to downwind states in only
one instance prior to GenOn REMA: the 1998 case, Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA.90 In Appalachian, eight northeastern states filed
Section 126(b) petitions seeking FIPs to control pollution from up-
wind states.91 The D.C. Circuit determined whether the EPA could
limit an upwind state's emissions under Section 126 while concur-
rently requiring SIP revisions under Section 110.92 The D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld the petition, stating that the EPA acted reasonably
concerning a state violating a separate functional provision of the
CAA, while also being under a legal obligation to revise its plan.93
Further, the court held that its view did not violate the "cooperative
federalism" approach of the CAA because treating the provisions as
separate was reasonable. 94 Downwind states, therefore, successfully
85. See Connecticut, 656 F.2d at 907 (reasoning no affirmative duty is present in
Section 126). The court's reasoning was as follows:
When § 110(a) (2) (E) (ii) requires a [] SIP to insure compliance with
§ 126, it clearly refers to subsection (a) only and not to the petition pro-
cedure set forth in subsection (b). Subsection (a) of § 126 is really an
extension of § 110(a)(2) in that it describes further pollution-control
measures which must be present in every SIP. It is thus altogether natural
that § 110(a) (2) (E) would incorporate it by reference.
Id.
86. 852 F.2d 574, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 578 (stating basis for claim).
88. Id. (detailing petitioner's argument).
89. Id. at 579 (stating court's rationale for holding). The court stated Con-
gress's silence is significant here because Congress often directly requires the EPA
to act. Id.
90. 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
91. Id. at 1038 (identifying states that filed petitions). The twelve states in-
cluded Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. The EPA,
however, only granted the petitions of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and
Pennsylvania. Id.
92. Id. at 1036-37 (stating issues present in case).
93. Id. at 1046-47 (explaining Sections 126 and 100 are separate functional
provisions).
94. Id. (articulating that in at least some instances section 126 will directly
regulate sources in state).
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controlled upwind states' pollution through the 126(b) petition for
the first time.95
D. Courts' Deference to the EPA
Courts usually grant the EPA great deference in making regula-
tory decisions.96 For instance, in Connecticut and New York, the
courts deferred to the EPA's determination that it did not need to
grant Section 126(b) petitions.97 In Appalachian, alternatively, the
D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's decision to grant a Section 126(b)
petition.98 Such deference is the product of a widely used judicial
doctrine: Chevron deference.99
1. The Hard Look Doctrine
The CAA standard of review mirrors the APA's in that EPA ac-
tions may only be overturned if the action is "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 00
The test, articulated by the Supreme Court in Kleepe v. Sierra Club, 01
requires courts to take a "hard look" at the environmental effects of
95. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans -
Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENvrL. L.J. 209, 342 (2004) (dis-
cussing downwind states' use of 126(b) petitions). Perhaps more important than
downwind states' Section 126(b) petition success is that "[t]he court upheld EPA's
interpretation that CAA sections 110 and 126 are independent statutory tools to
address interstate pollution transport; therefore, EPA may deploy them either sin-
gly or in tandem." Id. at 341-42.
96. Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decision-Making,
Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 767, 771 (2008) (stating Chevron is standard of deference provided to federal
agencies). In more complicated EPA actions, "The circuits have shown, however, a
strong willingness to defer, under any doctrine or framework, to agency action
when environmental scientific expertise is required." Id.
97. See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981) (accepting EPA's
promulgation of rule); see also New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(stating court must defer highly to agency action). In regard to scientific determi-
nations, the New York court stated, "It is well established that when a court is review-
ing predictions within an agency's area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science, the court must generally be at its most deferential." New York, 852 F.2d at
580 (quoting Bait. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1048 (applying second step of Chevron
framework).
99. For a discussion of the hard look test and the Chevron framework, see infra
notes 100-122 and accompanying text.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012) (establishing standard of review for EPA
actions).
101. 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (providing standard of review to measure
whether agency actions are arbitrary and capricious).
14
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an agency's proposed action. 102 Surmounting the hard look stan-
dard requires agencies to explain factors it considered in the deci-
sion-making process and the weight given those factors.103 The
hard look doctrine ultimately is deferential to agency decision-mak-
ing.104 It is "a narrow standard of review in which a court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."105
2. Chevron Deference
In Appalachian and GenOn REMA, the courts applied the oft-
used deference test created in Chevron.1 06 In Chevron, the Supreme
Court unanimously created a two-prong test concerning judicial re-
view of an agency's statutory interpretation of a statute the agency
administers. 107 Chevron concerned the EPA's interpretation of a
"stationary source" under the 1977 CAA.' 08 The EPA initially used
dual interpretations to define a stationary source as applying to ei-
ther an individual pollution-emitting device at a facility or to the
emitting facility itself.109 In 1981, however, the EPA promulgated a
regulation that adopted a strictly plant-wide definition of the
term. 110
102. Morton, 458 F.2d at 837 (stating hard look is merited for scientific deter-
minations of agency action).
103. See Todd S. Aagaard, Factual Premises of Statutory Interpretation in Agency
Review Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 366, 377 (2009) (explaining arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard). Professor Aagaard states, "Under the 'arbitrary and capricious'
standard, the court's review is deferential to the agency, but the court must be
satisfied that the agency has examined the relevant data and explained the basis
for its action." Id.
104. GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 525 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)) (stating standard of review).
105. Id. (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43) (indicating courts give agency ex-
pert opinions great deference). To overrule a scientific standard, the agency's de-
termination must be "so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise." State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (stating how
expert determinations can fail in limited circumstances).
106. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(applying second step of Chevron framework); GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 519-23
(applying both steps of Chevron framework).
107. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (creating two-prong test for statutory interpretation).
108. Id. at 840 (stating basis for case).
109. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (describing prior EPA regulatory interpretation concerning stationary
polluting sources).
110. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementa-
tion Plans and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg.
50,766, 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pts. 51, 52) (implement-
ing new definition of plant-wide source).
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In upholding the EPA's action, the Court articulated a new def-
erence test for agency interpretation of a statute.'11 First, a court
should use statutory construction tools to determine "whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 12 If
Congress has spoken to the issue, "that is the end of the matter." 1 3
If, however, "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 114
Notably, the degree of judicial deference granted "to the
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision de-
pends on circumstances" surrounding the agency's interpreta-
tion.115 If the agency's interpretation is authoritative, such as in the
promulgation of a regulation, "courts will give the interpretation
controlling weight as long as the interpretation is reasonable."" 6 If
the agency's interpretation is non-authoritative, "such as in an opin-
ion letter, courts will defer to the interpretation only to the extent it
is persuasive, taking into account the context in which the interpre-
tation was made."117 An agency, therefore, possesses the ability to
influence possible court decisions with the weight of its own
authority.118
Chevron's impact on environmental law cannot be understated:
It is "the most cited case in modern public law."119 In fact, Chevron
111. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (articulating two-step deference test given to
agency interpretations of statutes). The Supreme Court indicated that statutory
interpretations confront courts with two questions: First, is "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. Second, if "the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
Id.
112. Id. at 842 (stating first step of Chevron).
113. Id. (explaining that if Congress's intent is clear, further inquiry is
unnecessary).
114. Id. at 843-44 (articulating second step of Chevron deference).
115. Aagaard, supra note 103, at 378 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001)) (explaining circumstances where deference is given).
116. Id. (citation omitted) (providing example of agency action that receives
great deference).
117. Id. (citation omitted) (providing example of agency action that receives
less deference).
118. See id. (noting deference depends on how agency delivers its
interpretation).
119. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 823 (2006) (explaining
prevalence of Chevron deference in public law). Professors Miles and Sunstein
note, "In the past quarter century, the Supreme Court has legitimated agency au-
thority to interpret regulatory legislation, above all in Chevron U.S.A., Inc v Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc, the most cited case in modem public law." Id.
See also Czarnezki, supra note 96, at 782-83 (noting Chevron's effect on agency law).
16
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is so widely used, one can make predictions about case outcomes
when courts employ it. 1 20 When using Chevron with ambiguous EPA
administered statutes, for example, courts will usually grant defer-
ence and uphold agency actions. 121 If the statute, however, is un-
ambiguous, courts are less likely to uphold the agency's action. 22
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Chevron Step-One: 126(b) Is Unambiguously Independent of
the Good Neighbor Provision
The Third Circuit began its decision in GenOn REMA by ad-
dressing whether the prohibition against interstate air pollution in
Section 126(b) applied only to emission limitations in Section 110
SIPs, or more broadly to all interstate air pollution.123 GenOn and
the UARG asserted the former, while the EPA and the NJ DEP ar-
gued the latter.124 The Third Circuit followed the Chevron frame-
work, aligned with the EPA, and held Section 126(b) provides
recourse for all forms of interstate air pollution.125
The Third Circuit noted GenOn's position failed to account
for the entire statutory scheme because "Section 126(b) contains
no temporal limitation on a state's right to petition the EPA."126
The Court further reasoned that it would be unreasonable for the
120. See Czarnezki, supra note 96, at 782-83 (explaining outcome of empirical
analysis concerning usage of Chevron deference). Professor Czarnezki noted three
outcomes from Chevron:
First, Chevron has increased the likelihood of affirmance of agency inter-
pretations of law, with deference rates above [sixty percent] or higher ...
Second, while both Democratic and Republican judges are likely to up-
hold agency interpretations, judges are more likely to support interpreta-
tions consistent with their perceived policy preferences. And finally,
voting outcomes are influenced by panel effects (i.e., homogenous ideo-
logical panels are more likely to reverse agency action inconsistent with
their ideological views, including in the environmental law context).
Id. at 783-84
121. See id. at 790 (noting outcomes in environmental cases where EPA was
primary litigant). On average, the EPA's actions are upheld 72.9% of the time. Id.
122. See id. at 796 (noting outcomes in cases where courts found EPA actions
unambiguous). Professor Czarnezki states, "[W] hen judges found a statutory pro-
vision unambiguous, they reversed agency action at a rate of 65.56%." Id. If the
statute, however, is ambiguous, courts will uphold agency action over 85% of the
time. Id. at 797.
123. GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 519 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting
issue is whether Section 126(b) relates to limitations contained in Section 110, or
more generally to all interstate air pollution).
124. Id. (noting disposition of parties involved).
125. Id. at 522 (stating EPA can make Section 126 finding independently of
Section 110 SIP process).
126. Id. at 520 (dismissing GenOn's argument). The court noted, "When we
consider the applicable language of the Clean Air Act in light of the overall statute
2014]1 585
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EPA to wait several years for a Section 110 SIP revision, as suggested
by GenOn's argument, in light of the sixty-day requirement present
in 126(b).127 In furtherance of its position, the Third Circuit ex-
amined Section 126(c), which provides that it is a violation of Sec-
tion 126 and the applicable SIP "for any major existing source to
operate more than three months after such [Section 126(b)] find-
ing has been made with respect to it."128 Consequently, the court
determined reading 126(b) as corollary to Section 110 would
render Section 126 ineffectual. 129
To bolster its position, the court cited Appalachian, which indi-
cated that 126(b) allows for direct control of emission sources in an
upwind state.' 30 Acceptance of GenOn's position, the court stated,
would render three subparts of Section 126 superfluous.131 First,
an emission source would remain operational for more than three
years following a CAA Section 126(b) finding.132 Second, during
an upwind state's SIP revision, Section 126 would not provide an
and its interplay with other related sections, we conclude that the relevant lan-
guage of the statute is unambiguous." Id.
127. Id. (stating EPA must act quickly after receiving petition or it would be
unreasonable). The court went on to agree with the EPA's determination in the
Portland Rule that "nothing in the statutory language in section 126 prohibits a
downwind state from filing a section 126 petition until after an upwind state, in
which the source or sources are located, has submitted, or is required to submit, a
section 110(a) (2) (D) SIP to the EPA for approval." Id. (quoting Portland Rule,
supra note 32, at 69,055).
128. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c) (2012)) (not-
ing Section 126(c) of CAA further supports reasoning 126(b) acts independently
of 110).
129. Id. at 520-21 (concluding GenOn's view would be superfluous). For fur-
ther support, the court relied on TRWInc. v. Andrews, which stated, "It is a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be super-
fluous, void, or insignificant." TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quot-
ing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
130. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 521 (citing Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249
F.3d 1032, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (relaying Appalachian reasoning).
131. See id. (citing Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1047) (mirroring argument, alter-
native view of Section 126 would render statute ineffective). According to the Ap-
palachian court, "[T]hree critical provisions of § 126 would lose their force if, as
the petitioners suggest, the lengthened timetable of the NOx SIP call were to sus-
pend the § 126 process." Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1047.
132. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 521 (citing Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1047)
(stating first provision of 126(b) would be rendered ineffective if 126 process sus-
pended by SIP process). According to the court in Genon REMA, "Section 126's
requirement that a source contributing to downwind nonattainment may not oper-
ate for more than three years after such finding would be eliminated if the EPA
had to wait for completion of the SIP process to make Section 126 findings." Id.
18
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independent form of relief for downwind states.133 Third, Section
126 would not provide an independent form of relief outside of the
EPA's discretionary policies because the EPA must act on the CAA
Section 126(b) petition within sixty days.134
In responding to GenOn's argument that the court's reading
would offend Section 110 by interfering with SIP implementation,
the court again relied on Appalachian.1 35 The court found that
nothing in Section 110 suggests states may "develop their plans free
of extrinsic legal constraints."13 6 The Third Circuit, therefore, in
applying Chevron step-one, concluded the plain language of the stat-
ute in its context unambiguously expressed Congressional intent
for Section 126(b) to provide an independent means for the EPA to
take immediate action.1 37
B. Chevron Step-Two: the Limit of Cooperative Federalism and
the Independent Federal Mechanism
Although the Third Circuit found the EPA correctly imple-
mented the statute under step-one of the Chevron framework, the
court proceeded to step-two due to "the novelty of the issue."138
First, the court addressed GenOn and the UARG's position that the
legislative history of the CAA "emphasizes the concept of coopera-
tive federalism, including states' primary responsibility in imple-
133. Id. (citing Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1047) (relaying second argument
posed by Appalachian). The GenOn REMA court articulated, "Section 126 provides
for relief independent of any action by the upwind state, while a SIP revision re-
quires action from that state." Id.
134. Id. (citing Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1047) (relaying third argument
presented by Appalachian). The Third Circuit in GenOn REMA further noted,
"[R]elief under Section 126, unlike SIP calls, is independent of the discretionary
policy preferences of the EPA since it must act on a petition within sixty days." Id.
It concluded, "These provisions support our view that the statute unambiguously
allows the EPA to make a Section 126 finding independently of the Section 110 SIP
process." Id.
135. Id. at 522 (disagreeing with GenOn's argument).
136. Id. (quoting Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1074) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (responding to petitioner's argument). The court in Appalachian ex-
plained, "SIP development, like any environmental planning process, commonly
involves decisionmaking subject to various legal constraints. That § 126 imposes
one such limitation-and it is surely not the only independent provision of federal
law to do so-does not affect a state's discretion under § 110." Id. (quoting Appa-
lachian, 249 F.3d at 1074) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 522 (concluding language of 126(b) is unam-
biguous). The Third Circuit reached this conclusion largely on the belief that
"[a]ny other interpretation would defeat the underlying objective of the 126(b)
petition process." Id.
138. See id. (stating novelty merited second step of Chevron). The court went
on to state, "Even if the relevant language of the Clean Air Act were deemed am-
biguous, we still find that the EPA's action was proper." Id.
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menting regulations promulgated by the EPA."'39 The Third
Circuit, while acknowledging cooperative federalism played a role
in the CAA, determined it did not aid in examining the rationale
behind Section 126(b).140
Ultimately, the court found Congress enacted Section 126(b)
because "the law prior to 1977 had inadequately addressed the
problem of interstate air pollution and that an effective program
must rely on the state that actually receives the pollution and has an
incentive and need to act."' 4 ' Section 126(b) thus allows any state
to petition the EPA to find "any new, modified, or existing station-
ary source in any other State is (or would be) emitting pollutants
which cause or contribute to impermissible interstate air pollu-
tion."142 The court further agreed with the EPA that Congress
identified Section 126 as an alternative method for states to address
interstate air pollution. 143
The court concluded that the CAA's legislative history estab-
lished Congress' intent for the federal government to play an essen-
tial role in mitigating interstate air pollution, despite that states also
play a role.144 Congress thus intended Section 126(b) to allow the
EPA to intervene as a federal regulator when states fail to carry out
pollution control.145 The Third Circuit even employed the D.C.
Circuit's contention in EME Homer that Section 126 is "a separate
139. See id. (noting structure of cooperative federalism present in CAA).
140. See id. (stating position that cooperative federalism does not aid in exam-
ination of Section 126(b)).
141. Id. at 522-523 (quoting H.R. 6161, 95th Cong. § 683 (1977) (internal
quotation marks omitted), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR
AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 2797 (1977) [hereinafter Section 126 Legislative His-
tory] (providing congressional intent behind Section 126(b)). The court noted
the legislative history states:
[A Section 126] petition process is intended to expedite, not delay, reso-
lution of interstate pollution conflicts . . . . [T]he committee intends to
create a second and entirely alternative method and basis for preventing and
abating interstate pollution. The existing provision prohibiting any stationary
source from causing or contributing to air pollution which interferes with timely
attainment or maintenance or a national ambient air standard (or a prevention of
significant deteriorating or visibility protection plan) in another State is retained.
A new provision prohibiting any source from emitting any pollutant after
the Administrator has made the requisite finding and granted the peti-
tion is an independent basis for controlling interstate air pollution.
GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 522-23 (citing Section 126 Legislative History, supra, at
311) (emphasis in original).
142. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 524 (citation removed) (acknowledging
House of Representatives' view).
143. Id. at 524 (agreeing with EPA).
144. Id. (noting legislative history recognizes Section 126(b) as independent
federal mechanism).
145. Id. at 523 (stating EPA can intervene when states fail).
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provision [from Section 110] that explicitly contemplates direct
EPA regulation of specific sources that generate interstate pollu-
tion."' 46 The Third Circuit further held that the EPA's interpreta-
tion of 126(b), in light of its plain language and legislative history,
was both permissible and reasonable, therefore meriting
deference. 4 7
C. A Hard Look at the Portland Rule
The court reviewed the Portland Rule and determined it was
not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law."14 8 The court acknowledged that such
a standard was narrow and did not allow the court to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.149 While the court indicated that
the EPA must "examine[ ] the relevant data and articulate [ ] a satis-
factory explanation for its action," the court noted that its review of
an EPA action is "highly deferential," especially concerning scien-
tific determinations. 15 0
GenOn contended the rule was arbitrary and capricious be-
cause it required a reduction in SO 2 emissions at Portland before it
required similar reductions from sources in New Jersey and before
Pennsylvania had to complete a new SIP for the new one-hour SO 2
NAAQS.' 5' The court disagreed however, finding the language of
126(b) "clearly dictates that direct federal regulation of a single
source or facility is justified when the EPA makes a Section 126(b)
146. Id. at 524 (quoting United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,
696 F.3d 7, 34 (3d Cir. 2012)) (finding Section 126 separate from Section 110).
GenOn tried to use EME Homer as part of its argument against Chevron step-two,
believing it established that FIPs could not be imposed without first giving the state
a chance to revise its SIP. Id. The Third Circuit however, turned the argument
around on GenOn by using EME Homer for support. Id.
147. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 524 (holding in light of legislative history lan-
guage of 126(b), Portland Rule comports with CAA under Chevron). While the
court next discussed whether the EPA consistently interpreted the term "prohibi-
tion," it is not relevant to the discussion here so it has been omitted from analysis.
Id. at 524-25. The court, however, held the EPA consistently interpreted the term
"prohibition," and even if they had not, the court still would have given the EPA
Chevron Deference. Id.
148. Id. at 525 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (9) (A) (2012)) (articulating stan-
dard of review).
149. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983)) (identifying standard of review as
narrow).
150. Id. at 525 (quoting Prometheus Radio Proj. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389-90
(3d Cir. 2004); N.J. Envtl. Fed. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.3d 220, 228
(3d Cir. 2011)) (establishing hard look doctrine with regard to EPA's scientific
determinations).
151. See id. (discussing GenOn's position).
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finding." 52 The Third Circuit, moreover, determined that the EPA
articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, "including a ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choice
made."153 The court therefore, concluded that there was "nothing
arbitrary, capricious, or abusive about the EPA's discretion in im-
posing emissions reductions on a single source like Portland." 154
For the foregoing reasons, the Third Circuit upheld the Port-
land Rule and denied GenOn's petition for review.155 The court, in
reaching its decision, held it was reasonable for the EPA to inter-
pret Section 126(b) as an independent mechanism for enforcing
interstate pollution control.156 It further held that the EPA action
was not arbitrary and capricious, thereby giving it authority to pro-
mulgate the Portland Rule.' 57
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The GenOn REMA decision, in upholding the second ever use
of Section 126(b), marks a significant resurgence in the ability for
downwind states to hold upwind states accountable.15 3 In applying
Chevron to review the EPA's promulgation of the Portland Rule, the
Third Circuit properly relied on judicial precedent and the tools of
152. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 525 (determining plain language of Section
126 allows regulation of single source).
153. Id. at 526 (citing Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 389-90) (stating EPA ar-
ticulated more than required amount of scientific data). For example, the GenOn
REMA court stated:
The EPA examined the dispersion modeling results that New Jersey sub-
mitted with its Section 126(b) petition to show that emissions from Port-
land alone caused downwind violations of the 1-hour SO2 NAAQS in
[Portland Rule]. The EPA also conducted its own modeling results and,
in doing so, considered various components such as model selection and
meteorological data, which supported its conclusion that the imposition
of emissions limits on Portland would address New Jersey's nonattain-
ment issues. The portions of the EPA's Portland Rule that describe its
methodology for the establishment of emissions limits and the incre-
ments of progress are extensive and well-documented. The EPA carefully
calculated the emissions reductions that were needed to eliminate Port-
land's contribution to nonattainment in New Jersey; the technical and
economic feasibility of the emissions limits; and the appropriateness of
imposing interim emissions limits towards achieving the final remedy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
154. See id. (holding EPA acted within authority granted by CAA).
155. Id. at 526 (upholding Portland rule).
156. Id. (holding EPA was reasonable in its interpretation).
157. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 526 (holding Portland rule not arbitrary or
capricious).
158. For a discussion of GenOn REMA upholding 126(b) petitions, which was
only the second time a 126(b) has ever been granted by the EPA and subsequently
upheld by a court, see supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
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statutory construction.' 5 9 Further, in focusing on the interplay of
Sections 110 and 126, the court astutely identified the legislative
goals underlying the CAA and allowed the EPA to pursue its statu-
tory mandate. 160
A. Judicial Precedent and the First Step of Chevron
The Third Circuit's decision to apply the Chevron framework is
inexorably the correct one. 161 Not only is Chevron the standard for
an agency's statutory interpretation, but since its inception, all
courts reviewing Section 126(b) petitions have employed it.162
There is, however, one discrepancy; under step-one, the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Appalachian found 126(b) ambiguous, whereas GenOn REMA
did not.163 The discrepancy is likely due, however, to factual differ-
ences; Appalachian focused on multiple upwind and downwind
states participating in NAAQS trading, while GenOn REMA only
concerned two states and one power plant.164
In applying Chevron step-one, the Third Circuit convincingly
found the language of 126(b) unambiguous by appropriately deter-
mining the issue to be a temporal one.1 65 In interpreting the stat-
ute, there are only two possible readings: Both the sixty-day
requirement in Section 126(b) and the three-month requirement
in Section 126(c) operate independently of Section 110, or they are
both subject to it.166 The Third Circuit correctly chose the former
by employing commonsense logic. 1 6 7
159. For a discussion of why GenOn REMA was correct, see infra notes 158-190
and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the legislative history and the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of that history, see infra notes 180-186 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of why the Chevron framework was proper in this in-
stance, see infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
162. See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying Chev-
ron framework); New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying
high level of deference); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1048 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (applying Chevron Framework).
163. Compare GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 526 (3d Cir. 2013)
(finding 126(b) unambiguous under Chevron step-one), with Appalachian, 249 F.3d
at 1048 (finding 126(b) ambiguous under Chevron step-one).
164. Compare GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 513, 515-19 (stating factual back-
ground of case), with Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1047, 1074 (providing facts and
holding).
165. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 520 (noting issue under step-one was temporal
in nature).
166. For explanation of the temporal requirements of both Sections 110 and
116, see supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
167. See GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 522 (noting agreement with position of
EPA).
2014] 591
23
Miller: Control thy Neighbor: The Third Circuit Upholds Direct Federal Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
592 VILIANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOuRNAL [Vol. XXV: p. 569
Two aspects of section 126 support the Third Circuit's hold-
ing.168 First, Section 126(b) requires a response by the EPA within
sixty days and makes no mention of the time requirements in Sec-
tion 110.169 Second, 126(c) provides that it would be a violation of
the provision as a whole for "any major existing source to operate
more than three months after such finding has been made with
respect to it."o7 0 Section 126 would be rendered ineffectual if the
Third Circuit adopted GenOn's argument that the EPA must wait
three years for a SIP revision before making a Section 126 find-
ing. 171 Jurisprudence further supports the Third Circuit's conclu-
sion that Section 126 is not a tandem action with Section 110.172
Although both sections reference one another, never before
have courts treated them as a tandem action.' 73 The two sections
are, instead, separate functional provisions. 174 In Connecticut, for in-
stance, the court held that although Section 126 is intertwined with
Section 110, Section 126(b) cannot "rationally be incorporated"
into Section 110 because "they are intended to be utilized in differ-
ing procedural settings." 75 The court in New York identified this
dichotomy as well, stating that Section 126 "containl[ed] no lan-
guage expressly directing the Administrator to reevaluate existing
SIPs," and if "Congress ha[d] intended to establish a requirement
for direct EPA action it [would have] said so."176 The Third Circuit,
in light of the statute's plain language and the context of its use,
168. For a critical analysis of court's reasoning about Chevron step-one, see
supra notes 165-167 and infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2012) (providing language of statute). The
only reference to Section 110 contained in Section 126 is the finding that a state
can emit in "violation of the [Good Neighbor Provision]." Id.
170. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 520 (stating time requirement in Section
126(c) only serves to further support proposition Section 126 as independent
provision).
171. For a discussion of Section 126 and why it would be ineffectual due to
the statute expediting the regulation of upwind states through more stringent
times, see supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
172. For critical analysis of jurisprudence support Section 126 as a separate
action, see infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
173. See Reitze, supra note 95, at 341-44 (noting courts consistently uphold
Sections 110 and 126 as independent statutory tools).
174. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (stating Sections 110 and 126 are separate functional provisions); see also
Crider, supra note 82, at 626 (indicating unwillingness of courts to treat them in
tandem).
175. See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1981) (reasoning no
affirmative duty is present in Section 126).
176. See New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting congres-
sional silence on issue relative to other sections of CAA).
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was correct in holding Section 126(b) provides an independent
means for the EPA to take action. 7 7
B. The Extra, but Unneeded Mile: Chevron Step-Two
If anything seems unusual about the Third Circuit's opinion in
GenOn REMA, it is the court's application of Chevron step-two.178 A
court usually only employs Chevron step-two when it finds that the
statute is ambiguous under step-one.17 9 The Third Circuit, how-
ever, used step-two to address GenOn's contention that the Port-
land Rule contradicts the CAA's legislative history that emphasizes
cooperative federalism.1 80 The court correctly posited that while
cooperative federalism is present throughout the CAA and Section
110, Section 126 is not part of the scheme.181 The CAA's legislative
history strongly supports the presupposition that Section 126 oper-
ates as an independent federal mechanism.' 8 2 Regarding the
court's argument, the CAA makes "the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment partners in the struggle against air pollution."183
The CAA's long history strongly indicates that Congress, aware
of the problems posed by Section 110 and cooperative federalism,
granted the EPA alternative and non-cooperative means to address
interstate air pollution.184 When contemplating the enactment of
Section 126, Congress stated, "[A] n effective program must include
a Federal mechanism for resolving disputes which cannot be de-
cided through cooperation and consultation between the States or
177. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's correct holding of Section 126(b)
as being an independent means for the EPA to take action, see supra notes 168-175
and accompanying text.
178. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (noting if Congress has spoken on an issue, that is end of it). Under
the framework articulated by Chevon, the analysis ends if the statute is ambiguous.
Id.
179. See, e.g., Appalachian, 249 F.3d at 1048 (applying second step of Chevron
only after finding statute ambiguous under step-one).
180. See Section 126 Legislative History, supra note 141, at 522 (stating Section
126(b) serves to expedite interstate air pollution conflicts). But see, Pleune, supra
note 47, at 537 (noting EPA's requirements for interstate air pollution rule contra-
vene cooperative federalism).
181. GenOn REMA, 722 F.3d at 522 (concluding cooperative federalism is not
present in Section 126(b) as Congress intended it to be separate mechanism).
182. See Section 126 Legislative History, supra note 141, at 522 (noting history
surrounding addition of Section 126(b)).
183. Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990) (discussing
relationship between states and federal government for implementation of
NAAQS).
184. Section 126 Legislative History, supra note 141, at 522 (noting committee
wanted entirely separate mechanism regulating interstate air pollution).
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persons involved."18 5 The Third Circuit, therefore, rightly found
the EPA's interpretation of Section 126 was in line with congres-
sional intent.186
C. The Court Correctly Applied the Hard Look Doctrine
Although it may have been a forgone conclusion that the
Third Circuit would find in the EPA's favor following the Chevron
Test, the court properly applied the hard look doctrine.187 The
EPA's action merited this decision for two reasons: First, the stat-
ute's plain language provides for the direct control of major emit-
ting sources in upwind states.'88 Second, the EPA's scientific
findings were so strong that the court could hardly call them into
question, especially concerning a complicated process like Air Dis-
persion Analysis.18 9 Given the scientific nature of the action and
the plain language of Section 126, the court properly applied the
hard look doctrine. 190
VI. IMPACT
The Third Circuit's ruling in GenOn REMA is likely to affect
NAAQS and SIP regulations in at least one area: the ruling will
likely increase the number of Section 126(b) petitions submitted by
185. See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 330 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1077, 1409 (discussing Senate Committee's view of 1970 provisions). Congress be-
lieved that the 1970 provisions were inadequate, particularly in their failure to
"specify any abatement procedure" if a source in one state emitted air pollutants
that "adversely affected the air quality control efforts of another State." Id.
186. For an explanation of why the Third Circuit's interpretation comports
with congressional intent, see supra notes 178-186 and accompanying text.
187. N.J. Envtl. Fed. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.3d 220, 228 (3d
Cir. 2011) (establishing hard look doctrine with regard to EPA's scientific
determinations).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c) (2012) (providing information for controls on spe-
cific sources). Specifically, the statute provides:
The Administrator may permit the continued operation of a source re-
ferred to in paragraph (2) beyond the expiration of such three-month
period if such source complies with such emission limitations and compli-
ance schedules (containing increments of progress) as may be provided
by the Administrator to bring about compliance with the requirements
contained in section 7410 (a) (2) (D) (ii) of this title or this section as ex-
peditiously as practicable, but in no case later than three years after the
date of such finding.
Id.
189. See GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 526 (3d Cir. 2013) (discuss-
ing scientific complexity of action).
190. Id. (citing Prometheus Radio Proj. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389-90 (3d Cir.
2004)) (stating EPA articulated more than required amount of scientific data).
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downwind states as they struggle to attain NAAQS standards.191
However, how widespread Section 126(b) petitions may become is
largely tied to CSAPR's fate in the Supreme Court.192 Still, an in-
crease in section 126(b) petitions does not mean the EPA will in-
crease its use of direct federal controls, as GenOn REMVA may
potentially be an isolated incident.193
The decision in GenOn REMA may lead to an increase in OTC
states pursuing 126(b) petitions, especially in lieu of a robust inter-
state transport rule such as CSAPR.194 Currently, OTC states and
other downwind states are resigned to submitting formal comments
on upwind states' SIPs and are attempting to expand the OTC's
size.' 95 These methods, however, have been unsuccessful thus
far.19 6 Filing Section 126(b) petitions seems like an effective alter-
native avenue for OTC states to limit emissions from upwind
states.197 The ability for downwind states to do so, however, is not
without limit.'98
The decision in GenOn REMA was predicated on strong find-
ings that Portland was the sole reason four counties in New Jersey
would be in nonattainment.199 As a result, states pursuing Section
126 petitions may struggle to persuade the EPA and the courts to
make a finding in situations differing from GenOn REMA. 200 Where
191. For a discussion of states' potential to increase use of 126(b) petitions
see, infra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of the status of the Transport Rule at the time of this
writing, see supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of why GenOn REMA may be an isolated incident, see
infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
194. Eastern States Weigh Legal, Regulatory Options to Curb Upwind Emissions, IN-
SIDE EPA (Apr. 12, 2013), http://insideepa.com/Inside-EPA/Inside-EPA-04/12/
2013/eastern-states-weigh-legal-regulatory-options-to-curb-upwind-emissions/
menu-id-153.html (proposing Section 126(b) petitions as option to combat inter-
state air pollution).
195. See id. (noting current efforts of states with lack of transport regulation).
196. See id. (explaining pushback from upwind states and lack of success from
submitting formal comments).
197. For a discussion of why Section 126(b) may be a viable way for downwind
states to address interstate air pollution, see infra notes 199-215 and accompanying
text.
198. Chris Knight, 3rd Circuit Ruling Could Boost Petitions Asking EPA to Curb Air
Transport, INSIDE EPA (July 16, 2010), http://insideepa.com/201307162440941/
EPA-Daily-News/Daily-News/3rd-circuit-ruling-could-boost-petitions-asking-epa-to-
curb-air-transport/menu-id-986.html (stating downwind states' ability to combat
air transport after GenOn REMA would be difficult in other situations).
199. See Portland Rule, supra note 32, at 69,057 (explaining results of air mod-
eling analysis).
200. For a discussion of the deference given to strong scientific findings
equating to a stronger chance of success for 126(b) petitions, see supra notes 107-
122 and accompanying text.
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states identify major sources of interstate air pollution using air dis-
persal modeling similar to NJ DEP's modeling, however, the EPA
may grant 126(b) petitions.201 GenOn REMA and prior jurispru-
dence further indicate that if the EPA grants a petition, courts will
likely uphold it.202 Such a trend is already occurring in other OTC
states.203
A town in Maine recently filed a 126(b) petition under similar
circumstances as in GenOn REMA. 204 The town of Eliot, supported
by the Sierra Club, found "emissions from Schiller Station impact
Eliot's ability to attain and maintain the 1-hour SO 2 NAAQS and
that this impact would be mitigated by regulation of SO 2 emissions
from the plant."20 5 Such similarity is no coincidence, and, as a Si-
erra Club representative stated, "What Sierra Club did after seeing
the Portland petition process play out, [was say] this is quite inter-
esting, and start[ ] looking at power plants and doing the same
modeling that [the] EPA and New Jersey did."2 0 6 Eliot's petition
employed the same air modeling analysis as the NJ DEP's and asked
the EPA to force emission cuts in the same manner as the Portland
facility.20 7
Whether the EPA will grant the petition is unknown; however,
on November 8, 2013, the EPA issued a Federal Register notice in-
dicating it required additional time to decide on the petition.208
The EPA issued the extension, stating, "60 days is insufficient time
to complete the technical and other analyses and public notice-and-
comment process required for our review of a petition submitted by
the Town of Eliot."209 The power plant at issue in the Eliot petition
is different from Portland in many respects. 210 Portland was a 400-
201. See generally Portland Rule, supra note 32 (approving of DEP air modeling
analysis).
202. For a discussion of why courts are likely to uphold EPA actions, see supra
notes 100-122 and accompanying text.
203. See Knight, supra note 198 (indicating states are more willing to prepare
126(b) petitions following GenOn REMA).
204. See id. (discussing facts surrounding Schiller power plant).
205. Extension of Deadline for Action on the Section 126 Petition from Eliot,
Maine, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,036, 67,036 (Oct. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R Pt.
52) [hereinafter Deadline Extension] (providing extension of deadline for EPA
decision).
206. See Knight, supra note 198 (explaining Sierra Club's technique moving
forward).
207. See id. (describing downwind states' effort to use modeling similar to NJ
DEP's).
208. See Deadline Extension, supra note 205, at 67,036 (providing extension
of deadline for EPA decision).
209. Id. (stating reason for extension).
210. Id. (describing power plant).
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kilowatt power plant with almost no pollution controls installed,
while Schiller is a 100-kilowatt power plant that also burns biomass
for fuel.211 Eliot's action, however, may be illustrative of a new strat-
egy for groups interested in curbing interstate pollution
transport.212
The GenOn REMA decision compelled large environmental
groups, such as the Sierra Club, to seek large S02 emitters and offer
modeling free of charge to the affected area.213 The Sierra Club
has expressed this type of advocacy may increase pending the Eliot
petition's success. 214 While downwind states live without a multi-
state transport rule, the source-by-source basis offered by 126(b)
may be all that is available.215
Eric D. Miller*
211. Compare GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 515-16 (3d Cir. 2013)
(stating capacity of Portland power plant), with Extension of Deadline for Action
on the Section 126 Petition from Eliot, Maine, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,036, 67.036 (Oct.
15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R Pt. 52) (noting Schiller Power Plant's size).
212. For a discussion of Sierra Club's involvement in the Eliot petition, see
supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
213. Eliot Wants EPA Probe of Emissions from Plant, PORTLAND HERALD PRESS
(Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/news/Eliot wantsEPA-probe.of-
emissions.from.plant.html?pagenum=full (noting Sierra Club offered funding
for modeling analysis of Schiller emissions). The Sierra Club acted as part of its
$30 million beyond coal campaign. Id.
214. See Knight, supra note 198 (explaining possible future tactics of environ-
mental groups to achieve compliance in downwind states).
215. For a discussion of multi-state transport rules and why 126(b) may be the
only option to mitigate cross-state air pollution, see supra notes 61-95 and accom-
panying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.S., 2012, Univer-
sity of Connecticut.
2014] 597
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